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Dense-Coding Attack on Three-Party Quantum Key
Distribution Protocols
Fei Gao, Su-Juan Qin, Fen-Zhuo Guo, and Qiao-Yan Wen
Abstract—Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study
of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and
the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of
two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs)
proposed recently, and point out that they are susceptible to a
simple and effective attack, i.e. the dense-coding attack. It is
shown that the eavesdropper Eve can totally obtain the session
key by sending entangled qubits as the fake signal to Alice and
performing collective measurements after Alice’s encoding. The
attack process is just like a dense-coding communication between
Eve and Alice, where a special measurement basis is employed.
Furthermore, this attack does not introduce any errors to the
transmitted information and consequently will not be discovered
by Alice and Bob. The attack strategy is described in detail and a
proof for its correctness is given. At last, the root of this insecurity
and a possible way to improve these protocols are discussed.
Index Terms—Quantum cryptography, Quantum key distri-
bution, quantum network communication, cryptanalysis, dense
coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
CRYPTOGRAPHY IS the approach to protect data secrecyin public environment. As we know, the security of
most classical cryptosystems is based on the assumption of
computational complexity. But it was shown that this kind of
security might be susceptible to the strong ability of quantum
computation [1], [2]. That is, many existing cryptosystems will
become no longer secure once quantum computer appears.
Fortunately, this difficulty can be overcome by quantum
cryptography [3], [4]. Different from its classical counterpart,
quantum cryptography is the combination of quantum me-
chanics and cryptography, where the security is assured by
physical principles such as Heisenberg uncertainty principle
and quantum no-cloning theorem. Now quantum cryptography
has attracted a great deal of attentions because it can stand
against the threat from an attacker with the ability of quantum
computation. Quite a few branches of quantum cryptography
have been studied in recent years, including quantum key
distribution (QKD) [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], quantum secret
sharing (QSS) [11], [12], [13], quantum secure direct commu-
nication (QSDC) [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], quantum identity
authentication [19], [20], [21], and so on.
As the most important application of quantum cryptography,
QKD allows that two users, generally called Alice and Bob,
can privately share a random key by using quantum carriers.
The QKD protocols are designed carefully so that any effective
eavesdropping will result in distortion of the quantum states
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and then be discovered by the legal users. The fact that legal
users can discover potential eavesdroppings is the key point
of the security of QKD. If eavesdroppings are detected, the
transmitted key, essentially a sequence of random bits, will be
discarded. Otherwise, a secure key will be shared and it can be
employed to encrypt the secrets communicated between Alice
and Bob.
Obviously, quantum devices (QDs) are necessary to realize
a QKD protocol, including the devices to generate qubits, to
store qubits, to measure qubits, to perform unitary operations,
and so on. For example, in the famous BB84 protocol [5], Al-
ice has to generate qubits in four different quantum states |0〉,
|1〉, |+〉, and |−〉, while Bob needs to execute measurements
in two different bases Bz = {|0〉, |1〉} and Bx = {|+〉, |−〉}.
Here |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). However,
QDs are still expensive because qubits are quite difficult to
deal with. In fact this is also the main reason why quantum
cryptography has not been widely used in our daily life.
Therefore, it is desirable to design protocols where some QDs
are shared by different users. To this aim, a new QKD model,
i.e. three-party QKD [22], [23], [24], appeared. Till now, most
QKD protocols are two-party ones. That is, only two users,
Alice and Bob, are concerned. In three-party QKD, another
participant, i.e. the center, is introduced to help Alice and Bob
to distribute the key. Furthermore, the center is equipped most
of QDs while the users has less. When this kind of QKD
is implemented in a network, one center can provide service
to many users. By this means expensive QDs are shared and
the expense of every user is reduced. As a result, three-party
version is an effective manner to keep down the cost of QKD.
As we know, design and analysis has always been important
branches of cryptography. Both of them drive the develop-
ment of this field. In fact, cryptanalysis is an important and
interesting work in quantum cryptography. As pointed out by
Lo and Ko, breaking cryptographic systems was as important
as building them [25]. In a QKD protocol, it is generally
supposed that the quantum channel can be attacked with any
manner allowed by quantum mechanics, while the classical
one can only be listened but cannot be modified [3], [5]. In
this situation, we say an attack strategy is successful if the
eavesdropper Eve can elicit all or part of the secret key without
being discovered by Alice and Bob.
Though in quantum cryptography legal users generally have
the ability of discovering potential eavesdroppings, not all
proposed protocols can achieve their expected security. Some
protocols were attacked successfully by subtle strategies which
were not concerned when these protocols were originally
designed. Quite a few effective attack strategies have been
proposed, such as intercept-resend attack [26], entanglement-
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Fig. 1. The process of QKDP-I. For the sake of simplicity, all classical
communications are omitted.
swapping attack [27], teleportation attack [28], [29], [30],
channel-loss attack [31], [32], Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
[33], [34], Correlation-Extractability (CE) attack [35], [36],
[37], Trojan horse attack [38], [39], participant attack [40],
[41], [42], and so on. Understanding those attacks will be
helpful for us to design new schemes with high security.
Recently Shih, Lee, and Hwang presented two novel three-
party QKD protocols [24], where one is executed with an
honest center and the other is with an untrusted center.
Here “honest” means the center always follows the designed
procedures to execute the protocol, and “untrusted” implies
the center might cheat Alice and Bob, and try to elicit the
key like an attacker. In this paper, we analyze the security
of these two three-party QKD protocols and show that Eve
can obtain the whole key transmitted between Alice and Bob
without being detected by legal users. This attack is based on
the technique of dense coding [43], which was also used in
pervious strategies [41], [42].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section describes the three-party QKD protocols in Ref. [24]
and introduces dense coding. In section III the particular
attack strategy is demonstrated, and some useful discussions,
including how to improve the protocols, are given in Section
IV. Finally, a short conclusion is given in Section V.
II. PREVIOUS WORKS
In this section we will describe the three-party QKD proto-
cols presented in Ref. [24] and a special feature of quantum
entanglement, i.e. dense coding, which is useful in our attack
strategy.
A. The three-party QKD protocols
In Ref. [24] two three-party QKD protocols were proposed.
One deals with an honest center and the other is with an
untrusted center. In the following description, for the sake
of simplicity, we will call these two protocols QKDP-I and
QKDP-II, respectively, and use the same notations as that in
Ref. [24].
Now let us see QKDP-I first, where the technique of “block
transmission”, proposed in Ref. [14], is utilized. This protocol
is composed with the following steps (see Fig.1).
1. The center generates n qubits |0〉 and sends this sequence
(denoted as Q1) to Alice.
2. After receiving Q1, Alice selects a u-bit random session
key K and computes its m-bit hash value h = H(K) as the
checksum, where u + m = n. Then Alice performs unitary
operation U0 = I (U1 = iσy) on the i-th qubit (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in
Q1 if the i-th bit in K‖h is 0 (1). Furthermore, Alice generates
an n-bit random string B1, and performs unitary operation
U0 = I (U2 = H) on the i-th qubit in Q1 if the i-th bit in B1
is 0 (1). After these coding operations Alice sends the new
qubit sequence (denoted as Q2) to Bob. Here
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, iσy =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
, H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
. (1)
3. After receiving Q2, Bob selects two n-bit random strings
R2 and B2. Then he performs unitary operation U0 or U1 on
each qubit in Q2 according to R2, and then operation U0 or
U2 on each qubit according to B2. These coding operations
are similar to Alice’s in the previous step. Afterwards Bob
sends the new qubit sequence (denoted as Q3) to the center.
4. The center informs Alice and Bob after the receiving of
Q3.
5. Alice and Bob tell the center B1 and B2 respectively.
6. According to B1 ⊕ B2, the center recovers the original
polarization bases of qubits by performing U0 or U2 on each
qubit as in steps 2 and 3. Then the center measures all the
qubits in basis R = {|0〉, |1〉}, obtaining the measurement
results C′ = R2 ⊕ (K‖h). At last the center announces C′ to
Bob.
7. Bob recovers K‖h = R2 ⊕C′ and verifies whether h =
H(K). If it is correct, Bob obtains the session key K and tells
Alice it is successful.
This is the end of QKDP-I. In addition, Alice and Bob
would also take some measures to prevent Trojan horse
attack. In this protocol the operations of qubit generation and
measurement are focused in the center’s lab, and Alice and
Bob only need to perform unitary operations on the qubits.
As analyzed in Ref. [24], this protocol has high efficiency.
It is easy to see that the center can obtain the session key
in QKDP-I if he/she is not honest [24]. QKDP-II can resolve
this problem, which is suitable for the situation where the
center is untrusted. Now we introduce QKDP-II in brief (see
Fig.2), which is useful when we discuss how to improve the
protocols in section IV. The first two steps are the same as that
in QKDP-I. After Bob received Q2, Alice tells Bob the value
of B1. According to B1, Bob performs I or H to recover the
original polarization bases of the qubits. Then Bob shuffles
the sequence of qubits and sends it (denoted as Q3) to the
center. Here the shuffle operation is actually the technique
of “order rearrangement” proposed in Ref. [44]. When the
center receives Q3, he/she measures all qubits in basis R,
and announces the results C′ = shuffled (K‖h) to Bob. At
last Bob rearranges the string C′ to obtain K‖h, and checks
whether h = H(K). If it is correct, Bob tells Alice it is
successful.
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Fig. 2. The process of QKDP-II. The classical communications are omitted.
S.F denotes the shuffle operation, and the gray circle represents the position
where another shuffle operation should be added to improve the protocol.
B. Dense coding
In 1992 C. H. Bennett and S. J. Wiesner presented a special
feature of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) states, i.e. dense
coding [43]. It was shown that two bits of classical information
can be encoded into an EPR state by one-particle unitary
operations. Specifically, if Alice and Bob hold one particle
from an EPR state respectively, Alice can send two bits to Bob
by performing one of four unitary operations on her particle
and transmitting it to Bob. One particle carries two bits of
information, which is the reason why it is called dense coding.
Now we describe how it happens in brief.
Four EPR states are
|Φ±〉12 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)12,
|Ψ±〉12 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)12, (2)
where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote different particles. These
states are orthogonal with each other and compose a complete
basis, i.e Bell basis BBell. There are also four one-particle
unitary operations I , σx, iσy , and σz , where
σx =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
. (3)
Without loss of generality, suppose Alice and Bob share an
EPR state |Φ+〉12, that is, Alice has particle 1 and Bob holds
2. Alice can encode two bits of information into the state by
performing one of the above four operations on particle 1,
under which this state changes as
I1|Φ+〉12 = |Φ+〉12, σ1x|Φ+〉12 = |Ψ+〉12,
(iσy)
1|Φ+〉12 = |Ψ−〉12, σ1z |Φ+〉12 = |Φ−〉12, (4)
where the superscript represents the qubit on which the opera-
tions are performed. Afterwards Alice sends particle 1 to Bob.
Bob can distinguish which operation is chosen by Alice via a
Bell measurement on particles 1 and 2. If I , σx, iσy , and σz
represent 00, 01, 10, and 11 respectively, Bob can obtain two
bits from Alice. For example, Bob knows Alice’s message is
10 if his measurement result is |Ψ−〉12. Similarly, any one of
the four EPR states can be used as the original state in this
communication.
Center
|0 · · · 0〉n
Q1
· · ·
· · ·
Ψ−
Q′
1
QE
Eve
U4
Alice
Q′
2
U4
Eve
Q2
Bob
BE
Fig. 3. Dense-coding attack on QKDP-I. The classical communications are
omitted. U4 represents one of the four operations {I, iσy ,H,Hiσy}.
In fact, the above dense coding can be generalized to that
using other entangled states and operations. In the following
we will utilize this idea to design an effective attack on QKDP-
I and QKDP-II, where Eve can totally obtain the transmitted
key without being discovered.
III. DENSE-CODING ATTACK
We take QKDP-I as our example to analyze its security. In
this protocol, Alice encodes the session key K into the qubits
in Q1 by unitary operations I and iσy . To prevent Eve from
obtaining K from these qubits, Alice randomly changes the
basis of each qubit by I and H . After the above two operations
every qubit is randomly in one of four nonorthogonal states
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. Then Alice sends the new sequence Q2
to Bob. If Eve intercepts Q2 and wants to obtain K by
measurements, she cannot distinguish the above four states
with certainty and disturbance will be inevitably introduced
to the quantum states. This is very similar with that in BB84
QKD protocol [5].
However, as we know, fake-signal attack [41] is very com-
mon in the analysis of quantum cryptography. If Eve replaces
the qubits in Q1 by the ones from some entangled states,
can she obtain K by collective measurements after Alice
encoded and sent them out? This question is very interesting
and difficult to give an answer. In fact, the answer is yes. This
attack just like that Alice sends the secret key to Eve by an
“unnoticed dense coding”. In the following we will depict this
attack first and then prove its correctness.
Eve’s dense-coding attack is as follows (see Fig.3).
E1. Eve generates n ordered EPR pairs in the state |Ψ−〉12.
All the qubits with subscript 1 (2) compose a qubit sequence
Q′1 (QE).
E2. When the center sends the sequence Q1 to Alice in
Step 1, Eve intercepts all the qubits and replaces them by the
sequence Q′1.
E3. When Alice sends the sequence Q′2, i.e. the qubits
after Alice’s encoding operations, to Bob in Step 2, Eve
intercepts it and performs collective measurements on every
pair of the corresponding qubits in Q′2 and QE in the basis
BE = {|Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ω〉, |Γ〉}. Here
|Ω〉12 = 1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉)12,
|Γ〉12 = 1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)12, (5)
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and it is easy to verify that |Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ω〉, and |Γ〉 are
orthogonal with each other.
E4. Eve performs one of the four operations
{I, iσy, H,Hiσy} on every legal qubits in the sequence
Q1 according to her measurement result. In particular, Eve
performs I, iσy, H,Hiσy on the i-th qubit in Q1 when her
measurement result on the i-th pair is |Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ω〉, |Γ〉,
respectively. Then Eve sends the new sequence Q2, i.e. the
legal qubits after Eve’s operations, to Bob.
E5. Eve obtains K‖h from her measurement results in Step
E3. That is, she knows the i-th bit of K‖h is 0 (1) if her
measurement result on the i-th pair is |Ψ−〉 or |Ω〉 (|Φ+〉 or
|Γ〉).
By this strategy, Eve will obtain the key K correctly if we
do not consider the errors brought by channel noise or other
eavesdroppings. Furthermore, as we will show, this attack will
not be discovered by legal users. Therefore, it is very effective
though it looks quite simple.
Now we prove the correctness of our attack on QKDP-I. In
fact, Alice’s two encoding operations I/iσy and I/H can be
treated as one operation, i.e. one of {I, iσy, H,Hiσy}. If Eve
can distinguish which one of the four operations is used by
Alice in her encoding, Eve will obtain not only K‖h but also
B1. This situation is quite similar to that of dense coding. It is
not difficult to verify that the four states in Eve’s measurement
basis BE satisfies
|Ψ−〉12 = I1|Ψ−〉12, |Φ+〉12 = (iσy)1|Ψ−〉12,
|Ω〉12 = H1|Ψ−〉12, |Γ〉12 = (Hiσy)1|Ψ−〉12. (6)
Therefore, when Alice performs her encoding operations on
the fake qubits in Q′1, the quantum state changes as described
in Tab.1.
Tab.1. State changes after Alice’s encoding on the fake qubits.
The first and the last columns are the original and the final states
of Eve’s entangled pairs, respectively. The second and third columns
are bit values of K‖h and B1, respectively. The fourth column is the
combined operation for Alice’s encoding.
Orig. Stat. k‖h B1 Comb. Oper. Fina. Stat.
|Ψ−〉 0 0 I |Ψ−〉
|Ψ−〉 0 1 H |Ω〉
|Ψ−〉 1 0 iσy |Φ+〉
|Ψ−〉 1 1 Hiσy |Γ〉
Consider the i-th pair of qubits as our example, which is
originally generated by Eve in the state |Ψ−〉12. When Eve
sends the first qubit to Alice in Step E2, Alice will encode
the i-th bits of K‖h and B1 on it. Without loss of generality,
if the i-th bits of K‖h and B1 are 1 and 0 respectively, as
shown in the fourth row in Tab.1, Alice’s combined operation
will be iσy , and then the state will be changed into |Φ+〉 after
the encoding.
It can be seen from Tab.1 that four possible final states
include |Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ω〉, and |Γ〉, which are orthogonal
with each other and can be distinguished with certainty by
measurements in basis Bz . Therefore, Eve’s measurement
results |Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ω〉, and |Γ〉 on the i-th pair imply that the
i-th bits of K‖h and B1 are 00, 10, 01, and 11, respectively.
As a result, Eve can get the correct session key in Step E5.
Obviously, with the knowledge that which operations has
been chosen by Alice, Eve just performs the same operations
on the legal qubits in Q1 in step E4. Therefore, the states
of the new sequence Q2 is the same as the situation where
no eavesdropping happens. Consequently, no errors will be
introduced by this attack and Eve will never be discovered.
Note that every fake signal Eve sends to Alice only contains
one ordinary qubit, which is different from a spy photon or
invisible photon, and hence it would be unnoticed by Alice’s
apparatus, including that to prevent Trojan horse attack.
In a word, the dense-coding attack is correct and very
effective for QKDP-I. Additionally, this attack is also suitable
for QKDP-II because there is no difference between both
protocols when Alice’s encoding operations are considered
(see Alice’s areas in Fig.1 and Fig.2).
IV. DISCUSSIONS
Now we give some discussions about the security of two
three-party QKDPs and our attack.
As we all know, fake-signal attack is very common in
quantum cryptography and some effective manners to prevent
it have been found. Then a question arises, i.e., why the
three-party QKDPs are susceptible to such a familiar attack?
In fact quite a few protocols [45], [46], [47] use similar
properties of single photons, including the carrier states and
the encoding operations, but they are all secure against this
kind of attack. By careful comparison between the three-party
QKDPs and these secure ones we can find the answer of the
above question. That is, in the secure protocols the users will
detect eavesdropping by some manners such as conjugate-
basis measurements after he/she received the qubits, while it
does not happen in the three-party QKDPs. Obviously, without
any detections, Alice can never discover that the qubits were
replaced by Eve when they were transmitted in public channel.
In the three-party QKDPs, to reduce the cost of users, Alice
and Bob have no measurement apparatus, and consequently
cannot take general measures to detect eavesdropping. Though
Bob checks whether h = H(K) at last, which is the only
detection in the three-party QKDPs, it is not strong enough.
Therefore, it should be emphasized that more attention should
be paid to the protocol’s security when we pursues low
expenses for the users because low expenses generally implies
low capability to detect eavesdropping.
Now we discuss how to improve the three-party QKDPs
to stand against the dense-coding attack. Note that in QKDP-
II the operation of shuffle is utilized to prevent a dishonest
center from obtaining the key. Actually this technique can
also be used to protect the protocol against Eve’s dense-coding
attack. If Alice adds a shuffle operation before her encodings
in QKDP-II (the position is denoted by the gray circle in
Fig.2), Eve’s attack will be of no effect. On the one hand, after
Alice’s encoding every qubit in Q′2 is in the same state, i.e. the
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maximally mixed state ρ = I , and then Eve cannot distinguish
them and know which two qubits are originally in an entangled
pair. Therefore, the measurement result will be random if Eve
still measures every two qubits in the same position in Q′2 and
QE . Thus, Eve cannot distill the key from her measurement
results and the eavesdropping will be discovered when Bob
checks whether h = H(K). On the other hand, because all
qubits in Q1 are in the same state |0〉, the additional shuffle
brings no changes for legal qubits. As a result, this simple
modification is very effective and interesting in the sense that
it can prevent the dense-coding attack but has no effects to the
protocol when no eavesdropping happens.
As shown above, the three-party QKDPs are insecure under
the dense-coding attack. One may want to know what is
wrong with the security proof in Ref. [24]. In fact the authors
of Ref. [24] presented a formal proof with the sequence-of-
games approach, which is often used in classical cryptography
[48], [49], [50]. However, the attack strategies considered
in this proof are not complete and the dense-coding attack
is overlooked. As we know, quantum mechanics have many
interesting or even counterfactual features. They not only
give convenience for the users to distribute a secret key but
also bring different kinds of new attack strategies for the
eavesdropper. Therefore, more attention should be paid to all
kinds of possible attacks in analyzing the security of a quantum
cryptographic protocols.
V. CONCLUSION
Recently, two novel three-party QKDPs were proposed, in
which, to save the expense, qubit generation and measurement
are not needed for Alice and Bob [24]. In this paper we
analyze the security of these protocols and find that they are
susceptible to a special attack, i.e. the dense-coding attack. In
this attack the eavesdropper Eve can obtain all the session key
by sending entangled qubits to Alice and performing collective
measurements after Alice’s encoding, which is just like the
process of dense coding between Eve and Alice. Furthermore,
this attack does not introduce any errors to the transmitted
information and consequently will not be discovered by Alice
and Bob. The attack strategy is described in detail and a proof
for its correctness is given. At last, a possible way to improve
these protocols is discussed.
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